Introduction
This paper focuses on the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 3 . It argues that the IMF's current governance arrangements are characterized by non-responsiveness to the concerns of key stakeholders in the IMF, lack of accountability, non-representative decision-making, lack of transparency, and poorly defined relations with other international organizations.
It further contends that the basic cause of the IMF's current problems is its failure to adequately adapt its decision-making arrangements and operating practices to the changes that have occurred in the nature and scope of its operations over the past 30 years as it has slowly mutated from a monetary organization into a macro-economically oriented development financing institution. Its attempt to squeeze its new functions and relations into its old structures has resulted in distortions in the IMF's relations with its member states and their citizens and with other international organizations, and in its internal governance arrangements.
The problems caused by these distortions are now coming to a head. The reason is that, while the ability of the IMF to provide satisfactory services to its developing country member states has been widely challenged for at least 2 decades, it's ability to effectively manage the international monetary system , to respond to the interests of the rising new economic powers, and to deal with the financial and monetary issues of most interest to the rich countries is now also being questioned by leading officials in its most powerful member states. 4 It follows from this analysis that the current governance reform proposals of the IMF Managing Director 5 -to increase the votes of certain particularly under-represented member states, and to significantly increase the basic votes for all member states-are an inadequate response to the IMF's problems. Even if implemented, they will only address one dimension of the problem.
In order to establish this thesis, the paper is divided into a number of sections. The next 4 See, for example, Timothy D. Adams, ""The IMF: Back to Basics", in REFORMING THE IMF FOR  THE 21 section briefly discusses some key points of the IMF's original governance arrangements and of the impact of the evolution in its operations over the past three decades on its institutional arrangements. Section III describes 5 distortions that have arisen from the combination of the evolution in the IMF's functions and the inflexibility of its decision making structures. Section IV briefly reviews the key governance problems that have resulted from these five distortions.
Section V contains a detailed proposal for a comprehensive governance reform program for the IMF.
II. The IMF's Original Governance Arrangements and the Evolution in Its Operations
At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the 44 participating countries, agreed to surrender some of their monetary sovereignty to the IMF in exchange for the benefits of a rulesbased monetary system 6 . The participants created the IMF to oversee the system. Its primary function was to ensure that members were following policies that were consistent with the maintenance of the par value they had established for their currency. To encourage compliance with these obligations and as part of the benefits of membership, the IMF provided financial support to any member state experiencing serious balance of payments difficulties 7 .
The operating practices and governance arrangements for the IMF were designed to support these original regulatory and financing functions. Some of their features deserve mention because of their relevance to the IMF's current governance problems.
First, the annual surveillance missions that the IMF conducted in each member state, pursuant to Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, focused on those macroeconomic variables that influenced the ability of the country to maintain the par value of its currency. 8 Given the 6 See Margaret Garritsen de Vries, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD 1945 -1985 14-20 (1986 Second, maintenance of the par value system also placed limits on the conditions the IMF would attach to the financing it offered its member countries. These conditions focused on those macro-economic and monetary issues that were relevant to the restoration of a sustainable balance of payments and par value for the currency. The nature of these conditions placed some limits on the IMF's intrusion into the policy-making process of its member states because it left the recipient state free to choose the specific policy measures for meeting these conditions.
It should be noted that the sensitivity of a change in the par value of a currency led the IMF to seek to keep the substance of the standby arrangements, particularly the Letter of Intent, confidential. Consequently, it developed a formalistic interpretation of the legal nature of a standby arrangement, which denied that the relationship was contractual. This avoided both the obligation to treat the arrangements, as an international agreement that, pursuant to the United Nations Charter, must be made public 10 and the vexing issue of potential liability that could result from states failing to comply with the terms of the standby arrangement 11 .
Third, since the IMF was designed to be a monetary and not a development institution, it did not formally distinguish between its member states on the basis of their wealth or level of development. Its justifications for this approach were that since all states were participants in the same monetary system, that the ability of each state to maintain its par value was influenced by the same variables, and that they were all vulnerable to the same types of balance of payments problems, they should all be treated in a "uniform" manner. This approach resulted in the IMF offering all member states access to its financing facilities on the same terms and conditions.
Similarly, the IMF's annual consultations with each member state covered essentially the same 9 See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 6, at art. V, § 1. 10 See U.N. CHARTER art. 102 (1945) . 11 See Joseph Gold, The legal character of the Fund's stand-by arrangements and why it matters, IMF ( Fourth, the IMF's original governance structure contained some checks on the power of the richest member states, even though the IMF's system of weighted voting gave these countries the greatest influence in the IMF. Since the richest and most powerful states could anticipate having to use the financing services of the IMF, they were unlikely to advocate policies that were unduly burdensome for those states that did use the IMF's services 14 . They understood that the policies they supported in the IMF could one day directly affect their own citizens and they could be held accountable for them.
Fifth, the governance structure was also build around the expectation that the IMF's The amended Article IV provides only limited guidance. It requires each member state to "endeavour to direct its economic and financial policies toward...fostering orderly economic growth…"; to "seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions"; and to "follow exchange rate policies compatible with the undertakings" of Article IV. 17 The lack of specificity of this language suggests, as in fact has become the case, that the IMF needs to look at any aspect of the member state's economic and financial policies and policy making arrangements that could affect its "orderly economic growth", its external balance of payments and the value of its currency. 18 In other words, the Second Amendment has resulted in the IMF dramatically expanding the scope of its Article IV consultations. 19 It has also led to an expansion in the range of conditions that the IMF attaches to its financing.
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The Second Amendment had disparate impacts on different groups of IMF member states. In fact, for most of the period since the Second Amendment, IMF member states could be 16 See IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, amend. I (1978), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm; GOLD II, supra note 9, at 108-113. 17 See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 1 (adopted July 22, 1944, entered into force 1945, amended effective April 1, 1978). 18 In recent years, as the process of globalization has intensified, the IMF has been forced to expand its surveillance beyond a national focus to include regional and even global considerations. . These countries do not need to pay particular attention to the views of the IMF 22 . For these countries, the most important of which are the G-7 countries, the Second Amendment meant that they regained their monetary sovereignty from the IMF and escaped from its control.
The second group, which consists of those member states that need or know they may need IMF financing in the foreseeable future can be called the "IMF consumer" countries. These states must pay careful attention to the views of the IMF because they will influence the conditions that the IMF will attach to the funds it provides the state. The IMF can also influence these countries' access to other sources of funds.
In recent years, a third group of states has emerged. This group consists of those countries that have good access to private financial markets and have accumulated sufficiently large reserves that they can effectively "self-insure" against the risk of payments and capital account crises. 23 The states in this group, like the IMF supplier states, appear to be in the process of "buying" their independence from the IMF. In fact, it can be argued that a key motivation for the Managing Director's current governance reform proposal is to give this emerging third group These five distortions are:
a) The IMF's relations with the industrialized countries, in particular the G-7;
b) The IMF's relations with developing countries that utilize or expect to utilize its financial services;
c) The IMF's relations with the citizens of its member countries;
d) The IMF's relations with other international organizations; and e) Three legal issues.
Each of these problem areas is discussed in more detail below.
A. Relations Between the IMF and The Industrial Countries
Since the adoption of the Second Amendment, the industrial countries, in fact, have relied on their own resources and the private financial markets to meet their financial needs. They have not made use of the resources of the IMF. They have in effect concluded that the IMF is not a politically or economically feasible source of funds for them.
The fact that these countries do not intend using the IMF's financing facilities has freed them from any need to defer to any advice the IMF may offer them in their annual consultations.
In other words, they have regained the sovereignty that they surrendered to the IMF at the When these are not deemed adequate, the G-7 have been willing to create additional fora.
For example, after the Asian financial crisis and the near bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, the G-7 became concerned about the regulatory framework for the international financial markets. These countries decided that they needed a mechanism through which they could coordinate national regulation of financial markets and financial institutions.
Consequently, they created the Financial Stability Forum 25 in which the regulators of the banking, securities and insurance industries of major industrial countries and financial centers meet together with representatives of the IMF, the World Bank and the BIS to discuss regulatory issues of mutual concern. They also created the G-20
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, which consists of the G-7 plus some other key industrial and emerging market countries.
Since the industrialized countries have no intention of using the IMF, it is reasonable to question why the G-7 have continued to support the IMF. The reason is that they find its influence over poor and middle income countries undergoing transformations or experiencing serious macro-economic and monetary problems useful. In particular, they appreciate its ability to compel these countries to adopt stabilization and adjustment policies that they deem acceptable. They also support its role as the crisis manager in countries experiencing debt problems. In short, they value having an organization that can focus on the problematic areas of the global financial system, leaving them free to shape that system to suit their own needs.
The wealth and independence of the industrialized countries, particularly the United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain and France, also ensures that they are the dominant force The result has been to enhance the G-7's control over the policy agenda in the IMF.
However, because these countries are effectively independent of the IMF, they never have to live with the consequence of the policies that they make for the IMF's operations. This means that they can make policy that is only of limited interest to their own citizens but that is of immense . Furthermore, to the extent that these countries succeed in their efforts to assert monetary independence, they will become a third group of member states that can relate to the IMF in ways that are more similar to those of an IMF supplier country than to those of consumer countries. To a significant extent, the current interest in governance reform at the IMF is attributable to the institution's and its more powerful member states' interest in keeping this emerging third group of countries engaged in the IMF.
The second group consists of those countries which because of their poverty or unstable political conditions are substantially dependent on official sources of funds. This group, in addition to needing the IMF's financial support, require its approval of their policies because their other official funders tend to rely on the IMF's advice in making their funding decisions.
While there are significant differences between the countries in the second group of IMF consumer states, they all share a common characteristic. Although the challenges that these countries face have a macroeconomic dimension, the primary cause of their social and economic, including macroeconomic, problems lies in the governance of their societies. In particular their problems are caused by weaknesses in their institutional arrangements and technical capacities which limit their ability to effectively make and implement policy. 34 Although these structural issues are outside the scope of the IMF's specialized area of competence it has attempted to address them 35 . This means that increasingly, in both its policy advice and in the conditions that it attaches to its financing, the IMF is addressing issues like bankruptcy laws, legal and judicial reform, allocations of public budgets, privatization, environmental issues, social safety nets, and banking reform that are not monetary or macro-economic issues. The specificity and micro nature of these requirements highlight the evolution of the IMF from a monetary institution to a development financing organization.
The broadening range of issues addressed in its annual surveillance missions and in the conditions it attaches to its funding is changing the nature of the relationship between the IMF and these countries 36 . In the days of the par value system, the IMF limited its influence over national policy making by concentrating its advice and the conditions attached to its finance to discrete macroeconomic variables. This imposed a restraint on the IMF's involvement in domestic policy making because it left the member state's government free to decide on the actual measures it would adopt to achieve these macroeconomic targets. The increased range of issues the IMF considers and the specificity with which it addresses these issues means that this restraint has now been removed. The result is that the IMF has become an active participant in the policy making process of this group of member states. In fact, because of its influence over their access to external financing, the IMF is often the decisive voice in this processes.
The combination of the IMF's gate keeping functions and its de facto role in national policy-making further tips the balance of bargaining power in favor of the IMF in both the annual consultations and in the negotiations with the consumer states over the policy conditions to be attached to IMF financing. Moreover, given the dominance of the G-7 and the other industrialized countries in the IMF, there is a significant risk (that has often in fact been realized 37 ) that these countries will use the IMF to impose their views of good political and economic policies on the developing countries. In fact, many people in developing countries already see the IMF more as a political organization that is biased in favor of the rich countries and their interests than as the technically specialized and politically neutral organization that it was intended to be. 36 Id. 37 See Kapur, The IMF, supra note 47, at 98 (quoting a supporter of the IMF in the U.S. Congress: the IMF "is in fact one of the best possible deals we could ever imagine: Its programs cost us nothing yet it provides enormous benefits for out economy and our foreign policy"); Paul Blustein, Today, however, the IMF's operations directly affect many, if not all, government ministries and the lives of all those people who will be governed by the policies that it helps make. This means that it is no longer feasible for the IMF to limit its interactions to the Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance. In fact, without directly interacting with a broader range of both governmental and non-governmental actors in the member states, the IMF is unlikely to obtain all the information it needs to play an effective policy making role. For example, it needs to consult with government ministries whose budgets and policies will be affected by the IMF's funding conditionalities. It also needs to consult with the legislators who must pass the laws that the IMF policies require. To be an effective and credible policy maker, the IMF also should hear the views of all those stakeholders who have the ability to influence the success or failure of those policy decisions and will be directly affected by them. To date, the IMF, utilizing informal procedures has consulted with some of these actors. However, it has not yet developed either formal procedures for ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are consulted or through which the government or citizens of these member countries can hold the IMF accountable for its actions in the policy making process.
The IMF has recognized that its programs have become unduly intrusive. In 2002, it issued new guidelines on conditionality that are intended to make the conditions more focused on its core areas of competence and to reduce the number of conditions to those that are essential to the achievement of the program's objectives. These new guidelines, however are drafted in relatively non-specific terms and it is not clear how effective they will be in reducing the IMF's intrusion into its members domestic affairs, although they do appear to have resulted in some reduction in the average number of conditions attached to IMF financial programs.
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It is important to note, however, that a reduction in quantity of conditions does not necessarily translate into a reduction in intrusiveness, particularly given that the new guidelines allow the IMF to continue engaging in institutional and governance reform in the monetary and financial area. In addition, the previous IMF guidelines on conditionality also attempted to impose limits on the scope of conditionality but these were largely ignored in practice.
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C. IMF Relations with the Citizens of its Member States
The creators of the IMF, like the creators of most international organizations, believed that it was not necessary for the IMF to have any direct interaction with non-state actors. They assumed that it would be sufficient for the IMF to interact with its member states through their representatives on the Board of Governors and the Executive Board and, in its specific These beliefs about the relationship of the IMF to non-state actors are no longer valid.
Given, that the IMF now actively participates in the policy making processes of those member states that utilize its resources, it is no longer adequate for the IMF to limit its interactions to their Central Banks and Ministries of Finance. For the IMF to be an effective actor in the policy making process it must consult with both other governmental agencies and non-governmental actors. This means that the IMF is now interacting with non-state actors and the policies it is helping to make are directly affecting these non-state actors.
The basic principles of good governance which the IMF advocates so eloquently to the governments of its member states should guide its own conduct towards those directly affected by its policy-making activities 41 . After all, there is no obvious reason why the IMF, when it "descends" 42 into the national policy-making process should be less accountable to those people directly affected by its decisions than other actors in this process. This means that the IMF needs to establish a formal and direct means through which those directly affected by its actions in the national policy making process can hold the IMF accountable. It is no longer sufficient for the IMF to assume that it can rely on indirect forms of accountability to these non-state actors.
To be sure there may be practical difficulties in designing an accountability mechanism 41 For discussion of developments in and requirements for international organizational accountability, see . 42 The analogy is to the law of sovereign immunity, according to which, a sovereign will loose its immunity to being sued when it "descends" into the market place and engages in activity that by its nature is commercial. There are other problems that arise because the IMF has no formal channels through which it can communicate with non-state actors in its member states. Under the current operating principles, the IMF, out of respect for the sovereignty of its member states, only communicates with non-state actors in a member state if it obtains the consent of the government, which can result in the IMF meeting with an inadequate range of non-state actors in its member states. Consequently, it is at high risk of making policy decisions for the country on the basis of insufficient information about the likely reception that the policies will receive and their chances of success. Furthermore, the failure to establish formal mechanisms through which it communicates with non-state actors and which are independent of the government has an adverse impact on the IMF's policies and its relations with the citizenry of these countries. They come to see the IMF as unapproachable and as an elitist, ideological institution that is uninterested in learning about the views of those who will be most affected by its policies.
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Another dimension to the IMF's relationship with non-state actors is the impact of its evolving operations on its relations with the citizens of its supplier states. Although these actors are not directly affected by the actions of the IMF, many of them see themselves as being indirectly affected by the IMF's operations. They argue that it is their taxes that support the IMF and that, currently, these taxes are being spent to support policies and operating principles that they oppose. Consequently, these citizens have begun demanding changes in the operations of 43 The the IMF. The NGOs that represent them have used their access to their own governments and to the media in the industrial world to raise these concerns. These NGOs have had some success in influencing the IMF. Ironically, the influence of these NGOs in the IMF is derived in part from the disproportionate influence and power of the industrialized countries in the IMF.
D. The IMF's Relations with Other International Organizations
The original conception of the creators of the United Nations system was that each specialized agency, of which the IMF is one, would exercise its authority within the limited scope of its specialization and that the U.N. Economic and Social Council would be the forum in which their activities would be coordinated 
E. Three Legal Issues
The three legal issues are uniformity, the treatment of political considerations by the IMF and the legal nature of the standby arrangement. It is important to note that each of these issues arises from the way in which the IMF has interpreted its mandate and are not explicit requirements of the Articles of Agreements. They are each discussed below.
As was explained above, the IMF, in implementing its mandate, developed the principle of uniformity. This principle results in the IMF granting all states equal access to its financing and other services without drawing any distinctions between its member states based on their wealth, size, level of development, or importance in the international monetary system. It has had the effect of protecting the richest countries from having to grant special treatment to developing countries in the use of the IMF's general resources. It has also offered developing countries some protection against being discriminated against by the richer member states 47 .
The Articles of Agreement also require the IMF, when conducting its annual consultations with its member states and when designing the conditions it attaches to its funding, to pay due regard to social and political conditions in the country. 48 The IMF has historically interpreted this requirement as prohibiting it from being influenced by political (that is noneconomic) considerations in its dealings with its member states.
49
These two interpretations of its legal mandate pose a number of problems for the IMF.
First, the principle of uniformity made sense when the IMF functioned purely as a monetary institution and all its member states, in fact, were utilizing its services. However, it does not 47 A good example of how the uniformity principle worked in favor of developing countries is the original decision to allocate SDRs among all member states according to their quotas rather than to limit it to the richest countries. 48 See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 3. 49 See Gold. See also IMF ARTICLES, supra note 6, at art. XII, § 4(c).
make sense when its services are only being utilized by its developing country member states.
For example, uniformity precludes the IMF from creating mechanisms that protected the poorest and weakest states from the undue exercise of power by the richest and most powerful states in the decision-making bodies of the IMF. Another example of the problems that uniformity creates is the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). When the IMF decided that it needed to create a special facility exclusively for the poorest of its member states, it could not do so with its general resources but had to create a special fund for this purpose. Since this requires specific contributions from member states, the PRGF has inevitably become politicized. Both examples serve to demonstrate that the performance of the IMF could be improved if it could distinguish between different categories of member states both in regard to its services and resources and in its governance arrangements.
Similarly, the IMF's interpretation of the requirement that it pay due regard to social and political conditions in its member countries made sense when the IMF's operations were limited to monetary issues. However, it is neither prudent nor principled for an organization that attaches 
IV. Problems Created by the Five Distortions
The five distortions discussed above are creating a number of problems for the IMF. The most significant of these are discussed below.
A. The Disconnect Between Power and Responsibility
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As was discussed above, the industrialized countries, particularly the G-7, have IMF and other international development issues. While many of these NGOs have utilized this situation to achieve a great deal of good, the reality is that they, like their governments, can influence the policy of the IMF without having to live with the consequences of their proposals.
One result of this situation is that proposals that impose substantial burdens on already overloaded developing country governments or that make unrealistic assumptions about the access of these countries to private financing are able to receive serious consideration 58 .
B. The IMF Management and Staff's Lack of Accountability
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As was discussed above, the IMF's existing channels of accountability are insufficient.
The problems in the existing channels of accountability have three important operational implications for the IMF. The first is that the IMF staff and management are effectively operating without any accountability. However, if the IMF staff are making policy in the member states, there is no obvious reason why they should be less accountable to those affected by the policies than the other participants in the policy-making process. In fact, it undermines the IMF staff and management's credibility when they advocate accountability as an aspect of good governance in its member states but do not apply the principle to themselves.
The second is that the IMF does not provide much guidance to the staff on how they should perform their responsibilities when they act in this policy-making capacity. For example, it does not give them formal guidance on such issues as what obligations they owe to those affected by the policies, what factors they should consider in making decisions in this process, and to whom they owe their primary responsibility. The lack of such guidance makes it possible for each staff member or mission team to exercise great discretion in its operations. It also makes it hard to hold the staff accountable. In this regard it is important to note that, unlike the World Bank, the IMF does not have a publicly available operational manual that contains the . 59 See generally ILA, supra note 52, at Part 1, § 1.
operational policies and procedures that its staff should follow in the conduct of their duties 60 .
Third, the IMF is performing its policy-making functions without establishing any formal mechanisms through which those non-state actors most affected by its actions can communicate directly with the IMF. In fact, the IMF is not unaware of this problem and it often engages in informal communications with these affected parties 61 . However, this means that the IMF, in consultation with the government of the member state, is choosing with which non state actors it communicates and is setting the terms for this communication. A more formal procedure for communication with these non-state actors --such as an explicit requirement that all IMF missions hold a public hearing in the country they are visiting or an explicitly recognized right to make written submissions --would ensure that many more interested non-state actors have a meaningful opportunity to communicate with the IMF. The IMF's failure to establish such procedures contradicts the principles of participation and the need for transparent governance procedures that it advocates to its member states. It also suggests that the IMF is often making policy without having access to all the relevant information.
C. The IMF and Other International Organizations
The expansion of the IMF's scope of operations has resulted in the IMF encroaching into the areas of responsibility of other specialized agencies. While in some cases the IMF may attempt to have communications with these organizations, there is no formal agreement designed to ensure regular communications at the staff level. . It may hire consultants to work on these issues, but it does not have the in-house expertise to fully evaluate the work of the consultants.
This situation will continue until the IMF either hires people with the necessary technical skills or establishes some sort of cooperative arrangement with the relevant specialized agencies. This creates a significant risk that the IMF will have inadequate policies in these areas or that it will assign a lower priority to these issues than may be appropriate in particular situations.
The UN specialized agencies' implicit acquiescence in the IMF usurping parts of their responsibilities also has adverse consequences for the functioning of the UN system as a whole.
It is resulting in a concentration of power in organizations like the IMF and the World Bank to the detriment of the other specialized agencies. This exacerbates the IMF's tendency to maintain that it has the "correct" answer for the major development challenges that its member states face.
The inability of other specialized agencies to effectively challenge the IMF's position increases the risk of the IMF giving wrong policy advice. Furthermore, the developing countries, because the IMF has the money, have no real choice but to follow the advice of the IMF.
D. Interpretation of Articles of Agreement
The IMF has not fully recognized that the expanding scope of its activities is calling into question its interpretation of its own Articles of Agreement. In particular, it raises questions about the limits on its permissible scope of activities and about the IMF's claim to be a "nonpolitical" body. The IMF has failed to define the limits of its mandate or to stipulate a principled basis on which it determines what issues it is willing to address and which issues are outside its mandate because of their inherently political or non-economic nature. This failure subjects the IMF to the charge that it is acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion in interpreting its articles. The solution proposed in this section is based on three assumptions:
1. Good governance of the international financial and economic system requires an organization like the IMF;
2. Given the current global context it is not politically possible to create a new "ideal" IMF and that therefore we need to focus on reforming the current IMF.
Thus, the comprehensive reform program proposed in this section of the paper is Council. It should be noted that currently it can happen that a representative of a member state attends Executive Board meetings on that country. However, the proposal is to formalize this process so that it is included in the Board's bylaws and/or operating procedures. Such an action will have two beneficial effects. First, it will encourage member states to engage more actively in Board discussions on the country. Second, it will enhance the channels of communications between the IMF and its consumer member states, particularly those that do not have direct representation on its Board. b) Give more resources to the Executive Directors representing IMF consumer countries so that they can more effectively represent their constituents 68 . This includes both more staff and more financial resources. c) Establish formal procedures for how the IMF will consult with non-state actors during its Article IV consultations with its member countries and when developing a program for any member state that wishes to use its financing facilities. This procedure should create a meaningful opportunity for non-state actors to submit information and express their views to the IMF. d) Establish a formal mechanism through which non-state actors as well as civil servants who feel that they cannot safely or freely participate in any meetings that the IMF might hold with non-state actors can communicate with the IMF. This mechanism should enable such actors to make written submissions to the IMF. It would also provide a mechanism for communication with non-state actors in those states in which the government will not allow 66 However, it also needs to undertake similar reviews of its relations with the G-20, Financial
Stability Forum, and other inter-governmental and international organizations, particularly the other specialized UN agencies. The issues of primary concern to industrialized countries would be addressed in other fora. a) Change the skill mix in the IMF to make it more suitable to the functions the IMF defines as within its mandate. This will mean hiring more people with diverse social science expertise.
This action will be less necessary if the IMF has better coordinated relations with other international organizations.
6) Legal Actions:
a) The Board of Directors, after a notice and comment period, should issue a decision defining the scope of the IMF's specialized mandate 81 . This decision, which would be part of the operational manual referred to above and would also help define the meaning of the restrictions on the IMF taking political considerations into account in its operations 82 . It would also help distinguish the IMF from other international organizations. The resulting clarity about the IMF's mission will enhance both the transparency and accountability of the IMF.
b) The Board of Directors should abandon the principle of uniformity and should explicitly categorize countries according to their wealth and level of economic development.
c) The IMF needs to clarify the legal nature of the standby arrangements. 80 For a discussion of the problems with the IMF being involved in poverty alleviation and PRGF, see Stiglitz, supra note 4; Eldar, supra note 19, at 515-16, 515 n. 31. 81 It is not unprecedented for the IMF to use a notice and comment period before finalizing its operational policies. This was done in the case of the 2002 Guidelines on Conditionality. See Bradlow, supra note 62; infra note 85. 82 See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 3. an increase in the votes allocated to those member states whose quotas are not an accurate reflection. It should be noted that this is similar to the Managing Director's current proposal to increase quotas. However, it is unlikely that a change in quotas alone will lead to any significant changes in the operations of or decision making in the IMF 84 .
B. Medium Term
c) Change the formula for calculating quotas so that it is based on purchasing power parity exchange rates rather than the current basis. This will have the effect of increasing the voting power of some of the emerging market countries, particularly in Asia. 85 d) The IMF should increase the number of alternate directors that can assist each director in more effectively representing the members of his/her constituency. 86 In this regard, it should be noted that Trevor Manuel, the South African Minister of Finance, has proposed that there should be one Alternate Executive Director for each 8 countries in a constituency 87 . Since this will lead to a more unwieldy board, the IMF may need to give thought to delegating more responsibility to Board committees.
e) The Board of Governors can approve the restructuring of Board constituencies so that the Eurozone countries are granted one seat on the Board with the combined voting power of all the Eurozone countries. This will have the effect of freeing up at least 2 seats on the Board which can then be allocate to new constituencies that are constructed to enhance developing country representation at the Board level, for example by reducing the size of the African constituencies. 88 While reviewing the composition of Board constituencies, it should reevaulate, within the constraints of its Articles, the desirability of having 3 single country constituency seats on the Board 89 .
f) The IMF should consider moving from its current practice of making decisions on the basis of consensus to making decisions on a basis that better reveals the preferences of those who will be most affected by the decisions. 90 One possibility would be for the IMF to require separate votes by those Executive Directors who represent developing countries and those who represent industrialized countries. Any decision would only be adopted if it commanded a majority of both groups. 91 This would improve the responsiveness of the IMF to the interests of both its supplier and consumer member states.
2) Actions to Improve the IMF's Relations with other International Organizations:
a) Establish formal and more extensive links between the IMF and other relevant international organizations (eg. United Nations, WTO, World Bank, UNICEF, WHO, ILO, etc.) at both the senior management and staff levels. These links should include regular meetings, staff exchanges, regular exchanges of information and reports and other publications, participation in joint missions to countries and formal agreements on the division of labor and responsibility between these organizations. It should also include a means for resolving any disputes that may arise between the parties.
b) The IMF should renegotiate its Relationship Agreement with the UN. The objective of this exercise would be to clarify the IMF's responsibilities to the UN and to enhance the ability of the UN to ensure the IMF fully respects the jurisdiction of other specialized agencies.
C. Long Term Actions: Those Actions That Require Ratification By the Member States
1) Actions to Make the IMF More Responsive to Its Developing Country Member States:
a) The IMF should amend the Articles of Agreement to increase the basic votes to at least its original proportion in the total votes at the IMF and to facilitate future increases in both basic votes and in the quota formula. 92 It should be noted that the MD has proposed an increase in the basic votes as part of his governance reform proposals.
b) Amend the Articles of Agreement to introduce a qualified voting procedure that requires that any decision can only be adopted if it is supported by both a majority of the votes cast and a majority of the member states. 
VII. Conclusion
The IMF is suffering from serious structural distortions that have slowly developed since the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. These problems create a substantial barrier to the effective functioning of the IMF. They can only be corrected through a broad ranging reform program that will overhaul the structure and operating principles of the IMF. Without undertaking this reform program, it is unclear if the IMF will ever be able to effectively make any useful contributions to solving the complex problems of poverty, inequality and inadequate governance which plague developing countries today.
